James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Masters Theses

The Graduate School

Summer 2014

Automated snort signature generation
Brandon Rice
James Madison University

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
Recommended Citation
Rice, Brandon, "Automated snort signature generation" (2014). Masters Theses. 301.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/301

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

Automated Snort Signature Generation
Brandon Rice

A thesis submitted to the Graduate Facility of
JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY
In
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the degree of
Masters of Science
Computer Science

August 2014

Dedication

To my wife, Heather, for supporting me and encouraging me to pursue my dreams.
Without your unwavering support this would not have been possible. I don’t say it enough
but “Thank you and I love you.”

ii

Acknowledgements
To JMU:
Knowledge is a gift worth giving and one I will cherish always.
To Dr. Brett Tjaden and Dr. M. Hossain Heydari:
Your leadership and guidance was a key factor in my accomplishments at JMU. Thank
you for your time and the opportunities you have provided.
To the SMART Program:
I never imagined I would be selected and in such short time I have nearly completed my
degree and will soon enter the work force. I am glad I dreamed big and applied to the
program. Without your support I would not be here today.
To my mother and father:
I truly cherish the time and love you have invested in me. I hope that through my
accomplishments, big and small, that you can take some measure of pride.
To my daughters:
Lorin and Sydney you are the loves of my live. May my joy be your joy and may you
take pride in my accomplishments.

iii

Table of Contents

Automated Snort Signature Generation .........................................................i
Dedication ......................................................................................................ii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................iii
Abstract ..........................................................................................................ix
Introduction ....................................................................................................1
Intrusion Prevention / Intrusion Detection System ....................................2
Snort ...........................................................................................................3
Snort Rule Syntax ......................................................................................4
Snort Configuration ...................................................................................8
Snort Rules Files ........................................................................................9
Packet Analysis ..........................................................................................10
Python ........................................................................................................11
File Formats ...............................................................................................12
Related Work..................................................................................................14
Automatic Signature Generation................................................................14
Network Intrusion Detection Systems Using Random Forests Algorithm 15
An Adaptive Automatically Tuning Intrusion Detection System ..............17

iv

Stochastic Tools for Network Security: Anonymity Protocol Analysis and Network
Intrusion Detection.....................................................................................18
A set of approaches to evaluate and address the accuracy problem in intrusion
detection systems .......................................................................................20
Methods for Speculatively Bootstrapping Better Intrusion Detection System
Performance ...............................................................................................21
My Approach .................................................................................................24
Functions ....................................................................................................25
Experiments & Results ..................................................................................33
Lab Configuration ......................................................................................33
File Generation...........................................................................................35
Signature Matching ....................................................................................36
Signature Length ........................................................................................47
False Positives ............................................................................................50
Signature Validity.......................................................................................53
Random Distribution..................................................................................53
Conclusion & Future Work ............................................................................56
Signature Generation .................................................................................57
Service........................................................................................................57
Script ..........................................................................................................58

v

Additional Parameters ................................................................................58
Integration ..................................................................................................59
GUI ............................................................................................................59
Noise Traffic ..............................................................................................60
Summary ....................................................................................................60
Appendix A: Source Code – autoSnortSig.py................................................62
Appendix B: Supplementary Code ................................................................73
printHex.py ................................................................................................73
genText.py ..................................................................................................73
randCheck.py .............................................................................................73
Bibliography ..................................................................................................XII

vi

List of Figures:
Figure 1: Firewall ..........................................................................................2
Figure 2: Example Run .................................................................................25
Figure 3: Complex Run.................................................................................25
Figure 4: Example Snort Run .......................................................................34
Figure 5: Wireshark Search ...........................................................................35
Figure 6: Percentage of file length ................................................................55

List of Tables:
Table 1: Snort Rules ......................................................................................5
Table 2: IP Packet ..........................................................................................10
Table 3: Content Matching ............................................................................31
Table 4: Text Files .........................................................................................38
Table 5: Word Files .......................................................................................39
Table 6: 1997 Word Files ..............................................................................40
Table 7: Excel Files .......................................................................................41
Table 8: 1997 Excel Files ..............................................................................42
Table 9: Executable Files ..............................................................................43
Table 10: PDF Files .......................................................................................44
Table 11: Word File Comparison...................................................................46
Table 12: False Positives ...............................................................................48
Table 13: False Positives Rate.......................................................................50
Table 14: Packet Capture False Positives......................................................51

vii

Table 15: File Types False Positives .............................................................51
Table 16: Large Signature False Positives ....................................................52

viii

Abstract
Network intrusion systems work on many models, but at their core they rely on
algorithms to process data and determine if the network traffic is malicious in nature.
Snort is the most widely-used open source network based Intrusion Prevention System /
Intrusion Detection System (IPS/IDS) system. It works by comparing network traffic to a
list or lists of rules to determine if and what action should be taken. These rules are
referred to as signatures, since they are intended to identify a single pattern of network
traffic just like a physical signature identifies a single author. I have developed an
algorithm that accepts as input any file or a directory and outputs Snort signatures. This
action allows a quick turnaround in creating a rule to stop specific information from
traversing the network. By using such a tool, Systems Administrators can better protect
their environments through custom rule sets. To verify the algorithm, I generated files of
various types containing randomized content and parsed them to generate rules. I then
used a Snort installation to process the rules and a packet capture containing the files to
determine if the rules operated as intended.
Previously, the creation of rules typically was limited to a very small group of experts
that focus solely on such tasks. The core of this research is to enable users to easily create
a custom Snort installation, in addition to utilizing the default signatures all Snort
deployments use. This increases the security of the assets that each site considers
valuable and can be used to prevent data breaches that a typical IDS/IPS deployment
could not. The algorithm I have developed is a beginning to the process of creating
custom rule sets in an automated manner based on the unique content of each user’s
environment.
ix

Introduction
The goal of my research is to generate Snort rules from any type of file. I designed and
implemented an algorithm which takes as input a file or directory and supports optional
arguments and outputs a valid rule(s) that will match the contents of the given file or
directory. It would have two-fold use: 1. it can simplify the rule generation process and
2. may also be used to automate the rule generation process when combined with a
recurring scheduled task. Both of these functions increase the value of a Snort
deployment, and they can be used to defend against unwanted traffic. Additionally, this
tool would make the content matching feature of Snort available to less experienced
administrators, while also reducing the time it would take to quickly deploy a content
matching rule. In typical Snort deployments a Snort system will pull rules from a third
party source and take action based on these stock rules. Great effort goes into creating
stock rules that take action against the latest threats; but even in the best case scenario,
the Snort system is limited to using rules designed for a generic environment. By
implementing custom rules, in addition to the standard rule baseline, the Snort system can
be tailored to the requirements of a unique network environment or to the unique business
needs of a deployment.
A security tool such as Snort is most valuable when it is used for its intended purpose and
to its fullest extent. By lowering the requirements to utilize the advanced features of
Snort, the security tool enables network administrators to more easily deploy a custom
defense configuration. This security component is often overlooked, because a custom
security configuration allows for a configuration designed to protect those assets valuable
to an organization. By limiting Snort and other tools to the standard out-

2
of-the-box configurations, they are being underutilized. The algorithms and processes
developed during this research are designed to change the difficulty of deploying a
custom configuration of Snort, as well as allowing for more interesting uses by adding
onto the core algorithm.
This project is a means to decentralize the control of a typical Snort installation’s security
posture. By expanding the number of administrators who can create custom rule sets, the
difficulty of extracting valuable information from a network is increased. This can work
against attackers and an accidental exposure by a user of the network. By identifying the
valuable information and limiting the paths it can take across the network, Snort can be
used to prevent exposures and secure sensitive data. The algorithm developed through
this project contributes to the field of information security by taking a new approach to a
common problem of generating signatures. Through the current and future work the Snort
system can be empowered to provide additional protection specific to each user’s needs.
Intrusion Prevention / Intrusion Detection System
The majority of network defense devices work in a similar high level manner. They are
designed to allow good traffic in without permitting bad traffic in. However, there are
various methodologies these machines use to provide this security functionality. In the
case of intrusion, IDS/IPS are operating in a set configuration which determines if traffic
is good (allowed) or bad (other actions taken).
Figure 1: IPS/IDS

Figure 1: Firewall
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Both intrusion prevention and intrusion detection systems work in the same way;
intrusion prevention systems have the added ability to prevent certain actions where an
intrusion detection system would simply detect the action and generate an alert or a log
entry. These systems work based on two models: signature and anomaly, which dictate
how they determine if action needs to be taken. In anomaly based systems a baseline of
events is established over a period of time, and future events are compared to this
baseline to determine if an alert should be generated. This process is often difficult to
calibrate, but can be used to detect zero day exploits or any other potentially malicious
traffic that falls outside of the set baselines. The difficulty with this type of system is it
being sensitive enough to take action when needed without creating an abundance of
false positives.
In contrast, a signature based system will analyze actions and compare them to a database
of signatures to determine if action should be taken. A common example is an anti-virus
solution which will scan files of a system and determine if any match the signature of a
malicious file.

Snort
Snort is a signature based network intrusion prevention system / intrusion detection
system originally released in 1998; it has grown to be an industry leader in open source
security solutions. At the latest count, it has over four million downloads and four
hundred thousand registered users; thus making it the most widely deployed intrusion
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protection technology in the world1. Snort has the ability to perform protocol analysis as
well as content matching giving it the ability to detect and act on a large range of
potentially malicious activity such as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, CGI attacks,
SMB probes and OS fingerprinting attempts1. For this project, it is the content matching
engine we are looking to utilize when generating a rule based on an input file.
Snort is programmed in the C programming language and supports deployments across
both the Windows and Linux operating systems. As an open source initiative, it has
extensive support of supplementary projects as well as the integrity of being available for
review by any user. Similar to the field of cryptography where the security should only
rely on the security of the keys, an open source project does not provide security through
obscurity.
Snort signatures are created by analyzing protocols or the content of network traffic. For
this project, the content matching ability of Snort will be utilized to create a rule which
matches the content of a file and allows the specified action to be taken. This requires an
algorithm which parses the file and additional optional parameters to generate an output
rule following Snort syntax with content matching features, so that the file is matched
while also minimizing the occurrence of false positives.
Snort Rule Syntax
Snort rules follow a set syntax. Consider the example rule below in Table 1:
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22

Parameters

Destination

any

Port

->

Destination

IP

any

Direction

any

Source

tcp

Port
Source IP

Protocol

Action
alert

(msg:”SSH
traffic
detected”;)

Table 1: Snort Rules

Action:
Each rule begins with an action which dictates what the rule will do once all the rule
conditions are met. This is a required field and the typical default value is Alert.
 Alert – Generates an alert using the configured alert method and then logs the
offending packet
 Log – Only logs the offending packet
 Pass – Ignores the packet
 Activate – Generates an alert and also activates a dynamic rule
 Dynamic – Rules which are activated and then function as a log rule
 Drop – Drops the offending packet and logs it
 Reject – Drops and logs the offending packet and then sends a TCP Reset or
ICMP host unreachable response
 Sdrop – Block the packet but do not log it
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Protocol:
This field is also required and defaults to IP. However, it also supports TCP, UDP, and
ICMP values. This list will most likely expand in the future, but for our usage we will
focus on the IP protocol as it encompasses the majority of means for moving a file across
a network.
Source IP:
This field is optional and can be defaulted to “any” which will match all source IP
addresses. A single IP address can be provided such as 192.168.1.100 or a CIDR block
can be specified such as 192.168.1.0/24 which allows a range of IP addresses to be input.
Source Port:
A source port allows the specification of a port or a range of ports that can be used to
only process the content of the packets if it matches the provided source port information.
Direction:
The directionality operator can be used to limit the direction of traffic that is monitored.
The most common scenario is to monitor from source -> destination but the reverse can
also be configured using source <- destination and finally the bidirectional operator <->
allowing for traffic to monitored in both directions.
Destination IP:
Like the Source IP field this section can be used to limit the scope of a rule or it can be
applied to all destinations by using the value “any”.
Destination Port:
Like the Source Port field, this field is used to limit the scope of a rule by specifying the
destination port or port range to be monitored.
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Parameters:
This is where the bulk of the rule is contained and is only processed once all the
preceding fields are matched. Since the parameters section typically requires the most
processing, it is important to limit the scope of rules using the available fields so that the
IPS/IDS device can process traffic in real time. A rule that is overly broad such as:
alert ip any any <-> any any (msg:”Packet detected”;)
would result in a vast amount of alerts as every single IP packet would be matched by this
rule. The parameters most focused on are the content, message, and SID fields.
Content:
Content is used to match the provided rule’s content to that of the traffic that matches the
rule conditions. An example rule would be:
alert ip any any -> any 80 (content:!”GET”;)
This rule would monitor the HTTP port of a web site and alert the end user when a
request that did not contain the ASCII characters “GET”. This is because the negation
operator was used to search for the absence of instead of the presence of a variable. The
content parameter also supports the use of binary data through hexadecimal notation. For
example:
alert ip any any -> any any (content:”|0A|”;)
This allows for packets to be parsed at the byte level. The pipe character | is used to
specify the contained string to be parsed in its binary equivalent. In this instance, the
hexadecimal content 0x0A is equal to the binary characters 00001010. This is the method
that this project uses as not all files contain ASCII printable characters. Instead, the files
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are parsed for a binary string represented as hexadecimal characters to be used with the
content parameter.
Message:
The message parameter is specified using the keyword “msg” and is used to append a
string to an alert or log so that it is easier to know what rule was triggered. By simply
looking at rules it is not always obvious what the intent is. This creates alerts and log
entries which are more actionable and subsequently more valuable. For example, adding
the message parameter to a previous rule:
alert ip any any -> any 80 (content:!”GET”; msg:”Non-get web request detected.”;)
When this alert is triggered, the alert or log entry will contain the message “Non-get web
request detected.” which allows the recipient to take any additional necessary action in a
timely manner.
SID:
The SID, or Snort ID parameter, is used to give each individual rule a unique identifier,
so that it can be referred to easily. This is useful because it allows the triggering rule to
be easily be located within the rules file for editing or even temporary disabling (by
commenting out the rule). In the absence of a message parameter, the SID parameter is a
great tool for pairing an alert or log entry back to the generating rule.
Snort Configuration
All of the Snort configuration is stored within a single file typically named snort.conf. It
is here the various settings of a Snort deployment can be customized and additional rule
sets added. As a typical rule, file inclusion would look like the below within the
snort.conf file:
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include $RULE_PATH/local.rules
This allows a file called local.rules to have its contents included in the rule set the next
time that Snort is started. The ability to add local customized rules files is important
because it allows the third party rule sets to be updated without overwriting local rules.
Snort contains a large list of customizable configuration options that each administrator
should consider when adapting a deployment. However, these options outside of the
inclusion of a rules file are outside of the scope of this project.
Snort Rules Files
Snort rules files follow the typical Python commenting syntax where any line that begins
with the # character is not processed. This allows for a header that is commented out to
be placed at the top of the file; then subsequent lines will contain the rules. Each rule is
located on a single line. The file is simply a list of rules to be processed by Snort at
runtime. These rule files are where the output of this algorithm should be placed so that
on Snort restart the new rule is included in the active rule base. This can be done simply
by appending the output of the script to the desired rules file through a command prompt
or terminal. Alternatively, the output of the script can be manually added to the rules file.
Snort supports the usage of multiple rules files which allows for a separate rules file as
needed. This allows a deployment to still subscribe to the standard rules files while
creating additional rules files containing their own custom rules.
Snort rules files are parsed at start-up time which means any changes to the static rules
files will not immediately take effect. For any changes to be applied, the Snort system
must be stopped and restarted. If Snort processes a rule file that is not valid, then it will
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exit and not provide network security. For this reason, it is vital that all Snort rules
contained within a rules file follow the appropriate syntax.
Packet Analysis
Snort’s content matching system employs a packet level analysis to determine the content
of network communications and parse them for signature matches. To better understand
this process the structure of an IP packet must be understood.
← 32 bits →
Version

IHL

Type of Service

Identification
Time-to-live

Total Length
Flags

Protocol

Fragment Offset

Header checksum

Source Address
Destination Address
Options
Data (variable length)
Table 2: IP Packet
Table 2 displays the standard format of an IP packet. The packet head contains the
necessary information to route the packet from source to destination and is often updated
as the packet transverses routers. The packet header is the portion of the packet which is
processed initially to determine if it is a possible match for any of the signatures within
Snort. If the packet header matches any rules, then the content of the packet is processed
to determine if it matches any of the rules not yet eliminated. Through this process, Snort
can process the smaller packet headers and limit the scope of the signatures to be
checked. Only once matching rules are found is the packet’s contents checked.
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Additionally the packet’s contents are still checked against all rules even if a previous
rule was matched. This allows a single packet to trigger one or more rules. Snort also
supports the ability to process fragmented packets where a single payload is spread across
multiple packets. Snort will then collect all the fragmented packets and process the
content as a single entity preventing the use of data fragmentation as a means to bypass a
Snort signature.
Relevant to this work is the ability to use packet capturing software to later be processed
by the Snort system. This allows network traffic to be captured, analyzed, and then
processed. This is important because it allows data to be permanently created, tested, and
then verified manually by viewing the packet capture contents and searching for the
generated signature. This also allows later verification of the testing process by another
party using the generated network traffic, source file, and algorithm. The ability to
duplicate results is vital to creating an algorithm that is dependable and brings value to
the end users.
Packet captures are stored within a file with extension .pcap and can be processed by
Snort at a later time. This allows a set portion of network traffic to be saved and
evaluated by Snort using various rule sets.
Python
When I first approached this problem, I knew that I needed to first select a programming
language prior to attempting to outline the algorithm. The criteria I established was a
concise language that could operate in the environments where Snort is utilized, fast, and
powerful. I examined languages such as C, C++ and Java, but found they were lower
level and performance oriented. This algorithm is not burdened with a high workload

12
since it processes files that are limited in size and processes files in a serial manner. As
trade off for a slight performance loss, I used a language with very weak type casting and
variables able to adapt to various input provided. This allowed me to focus on the
transformation of the input into an acceptable output instead of worrying about pointers
or variables with a maximum size.
In addition to its concise and powerful notation, the Python language comes with built-in
functionality for reading files and converting data to hex values. This greatly simplified
the process, as demonstrated in the code printHex.py in Appendix B, of converting a file
into a hex string. Once this was done, the task of parsing the file into a signature is much
simpler. These built in functions allowed me to utilize known, good code while also
keeping the length of my own code to a minimum. By keeping my own code base
minimal, it is easier for outside parties to understand and validate contents.
File Formats
In the simplest form, all files are stored in binary format as a string of 1s and 0s. Like
most data, it is not very useful until it is given meaning. With computers this is done by
giving files types, so that they can be processed according to the contents they are
storing. In this way, each string of 1s and 0s can identify that they should be parsed into a
picture, an executable, or a document. Even within a specific file purpose, such as a
picture, many formats are available to encode the data into a string of 1s and 0s (such as
JPG, BMP, and PNG).
This can lead to situations where the format of a file requires that it contain subsections
of a certain length. Ideally, any algorithm that created signatures from files would only be
concerned with the specific subsections that hold the data unique to a specific file.
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However, this would require all file formats be known and each would be processed in a
custom manner.
Instead, the algorithm treats all file formats as a string of binary characters to be
processed. Assumptions are made to attempt to align the signature generation algorithm
with the portion of the files more likely to contain unique data. To do this, the beginning
and end of the files are avoided as these are the common locations that a file format
would use to store additional information such as the date created or the author. It is also
assumed that the file(s) that are to be parsed are in the format they will transverse the
network. Any later change such as encryption or compression would result in a change of
the files binary content and thus the two formats would require separate signatures.
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Related Work
Automatic Signature Generation
In a 2009 paper2 Alysson Santos of the Federal University of Pernambuco approached the
problem of creating, testing, and characterizing signatures for a deep packet inspection
(DPI) system in an automated manner. This work simply on topic alone mirrors my work
with the primary difference being Santos was working with network traffic, whereas I am
working with flat files. This differentiates the necessary algorithm since Santos is
generating multiple signatures across a growing data set. In contrast the algorithm I
developed takes a set data set defined at runtime and creates signatures on a one-to-one
basis. Santos followed a methodology of creating tools which generated signatures,
generated patterns, and finally a tool to generate traffic. This allowed her to create an
environment that would mimic an actual network, and then test it to see how effectively
she was generating signatures.
Santos built upon a previously developed algorithm to parse the generated traffic and
identify substrings that were repeating and could be used to classify traffic. Santos ran
into difficulty handling large network traffic as it required an exponential amount of
memory and computations to parse the file and generate signatures. Despite this, the
signature was effective at generating usable signatures, but it did require calibration. The
requirement of calibration caused her algorithm to be less automated than she desired.
However, it did simplify the signature generation process and allowed for already
generated signatures to be tested.
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Santos also built a traffic generator which created point to point configured traffic that
allowed her to test already generated signatures. This tool is independent of her own
signature generation process and could test signatures generated by other means as well
as her own. This allowed her to validate the algorithm she was utilizing to create the
signatures as well as provide additional value to users of her tools.
Santos' work provided a framework on how to approach my own research. I needed an
algorithm that generated signatures as well as a means to test the validity of my results.
This lead me to first focus on the Python algorithm which parses the file(s) and outputs
the signature. From there, I developed a methodology that allowed me to verify the
validity of the results I had obtained. Additionally, I focused on the performance aspects
of my algorithm by limiting the total size of the file or file portion to be processed. I was
also able to minimize the application’s footprint by processing files sequentially, which
was not an option for Santos. This is achieved because each file is treated is a unique data
set and processed individually. Santos was required to process all traffic as a single entity
which is why she had problems with scaling her algorithms.
Network Intrusion Detection Systems Using Random Forests Algorithm
In a 2005 paper3 Jiong Zhang of Queen’s University approached the limitations of rulebased signatures within intrusion detection systems. To do this he approached the concept
of a hybrid system that utilized a rules-based system to detect known intrusions and also
used an outlier detection algorithm to determine when traffic was outside the norm and
possibly malicious. To do this he parsed random forests over training data to establish
baselines, and then he detected events that were outliers. This combined approach to

16
intrusion detection is designed to provide better security by utilizing two technologies
that have weaknesses that are offset by each other.
This research is similar in that it wishes to automate the signature generation process and
thus improve over the traditional intrusion detection system which operates on rules often
created manually. Manual rule creation is a process that requires a high level of
knowledge and is time consuming. This is a challenge that Zhang and I both approached
using different methodologies.
An interesting process employed by Zhang was to use the misuse detection engine which
is rule based to screen data prior to parsing it for outliers. This removed the bulk of
intrusions as they will utilize a known attack vector. By doing so, the resulting dataset
was relatively clean and allowed for a more accurate baseline to be established. This
resulted in baselines which accurately captured the benign traffic and could then be used
to better identify outliers. Without this process, the number of intrusions attempted
against a system that is publicly accessible leads to baselines that may include intrusion
attempts and thus would not be good for establishing a baseline.
The forests algorithm used by Zhang has been applied in other fields and is valid in its
ability to predict future events based on a dataset. This allows Zhang to parse a dataset
and use it to predict future events. This intrusion prediction data can then be used to
better establish rules that protect against malicious traffic that is likely to come. This is
very akin to machine learning where a dataset is used to allow an algorithm to learn to
make better decisions over time. Applying this concept to intrusion detection just makes
sense.
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From this work I was able to better understand the limitations of rule based systems such
as Snort. Using this knowledge I attempted to also bridge the gap of creating signatures in
an automated manner. While Zhang applied his methods to network traffic, the concepts
and the pitfalls he worked to overcome are also applicable to flat files.
An Adaptive Automatically Tuning Intrusion Detection System
In 2007, Zhenwei Yu wrote a thesis dissertation4 for the University of Illinois Chicago
regarding an intrusion detection system that eases the calibration challenge typically
associated with such devices. When an intrusion detection system is under calibrated it
results in a large amount of false positives which can overwhelm an administrator
resulting in valid alerts being disregarded or under-investigated. In contrast, a system that
is overly tuned will not report intrusions and loses value, because it is not accomplishing
its primary task. To overcome this problem, Yu proposed a system that would calibrate
itself in an automated manner using user feedback. Primarily, the user would identify
false positives as they arose and using this information the system could be calibrated to
the user’s desired level without the user engaging in direct calibration.
To approach this problem, Yu first had to analyze an intrusion detection model and
determine which components would need to be adjusted to calibrate the device. This
became complicated because many intrusion detection models are in place including the
rules-based system employed by Snort. Yu discovered the best solution was to employ a
typical rules-based system and then combine it with a predictive system. It is these
predictive systems that are tuned to reduce false positives. Since rules-based systems are
designed to detect only certain instances they can do so with a high degree of assurance.
From that point the predictive model was used to generate events which the administrator
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would then classify as legitimate or as a false positive. This feedback was then used to
feed the algorithm which would alter its detection algorithm and the wait for further user
input.
Similar to my research, the goal of this paper is to automate a difficult process involving
intrusion detection systems. Also, similar to the work completed by Zhang, a hybrid
model was employed that built upon the rule-based model employed by Snort. This
model goes beyond a simple content checking system and attempts to determine outlier
instances that may be malicious. This paper identifies the weaknesses and difficulty of
working with a rules-based system and allowed me to focus my work on easing this
process and creating a better value from rules-based systems.
Stochastic Tools for Network Security: Anonymity Protocol Analysis and Network
Intrusion Detection
In 2012, while at Clemson University, Lu Yu researched anonymity protocol analysis and
its impact on network based intrusion detection systems5. In specific, Yu analyzed the
anonymity protocol The Onion Router (TOR) and how it may be possible to detect a
protocol despite it being tunneled through such a system. The ability to detect protocols
taken across an anonymity service such as TOR would be a boon for any large network
provider, such as an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or an entity tasked with surveying a
network.
One such entity tasked with surveying a network is the intrusion detection system. Yu
proposed a system that utilized a combination of honeypots and intrusion detection
systems to provide a network security scheme that was able to make predictive protocol
matching based on past data sets. A key challenge to such a system is the ability to scale
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as the network and thus the network traffic grows. For the system to operate it requires
the honeypots and intrusion detection systems to be placed throughout the network and
then combine the data into a single data set that can be used to make predictive protocol
matching and thus attempt to take action against traffic despite an end user using an
anonymity service. This is a clear example of exponential growth as the number of data
collection devices increases the likelihood of detecting traffic at multiple points increases;
thus the total data to be processed grows by a factor greater than one.
At the core of this research is the problem of attempting to identify certain behavior
within a data set that has been anonymized. I was able to analyze the methods Lu used to
improve my algorithm in order to extract a signature from within a file that could be of
any data type. In essence, I had to approach each file without any assumption about the
contents of the file since the algorithm was required to process all data types. This mind
set is very similar to the process of attempting to extract from anonymized data.
Yu concluded through side channel attacks it was possible to make predictive
assumptions about activity being taken by users using anonymity services. This is done
by analyzing the delay between each pair of successive packets and then identifying
protocols based on the initiators of a particular service. This is done by eavesdropping on
the respective communication partners to attempt to ascertain the identity of users.
Finally, Yu proposed a combination of honeypots and host-based intrusion detection
systems may be the best approach to limiting the effectiveness of anonymity services. If
traffic can be monitored from one end point to another, then it is possible to make certain
assumptions and in some cases determine the nature of the communications, despite the
anonymity service.
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A set of approaches to evaluate and address the accuracy problem in intrusion
detection systems
In a 2010 paper Frederic Massicotte of Ottawa-Carleton Institute of Eletrical and
Computer Engineering wrote a thesis6 regarding the accuracy of intrusion detection
systems. By accuracy, Massicotte was speaking primarily about the false positives that
can overwhelm an administrator and distract him or her from the alerts worth
investigating. To accomplish this he analyzed the process of testing and evaluating IDS
devices to determine if and when they are accurate. Additionally, he looked into intrusion
detection systems signatures and how to automatically generate signatures.
One of the key components to Massicotte’s research was a model for testing of intrusion
detection systems that determined accuracy of the device. As a specific example,
Massicotte used the Snort intrusion detection system to illustrate how the process would
work in a real-world scenario. This was valuable insight since the Snort program is
featured prominently in my research as well. Massicotte tested across three levels
(predicate, logic, and state machine levels). He designed test conditions and criteria
allowing for meaningful results. This methodology can be applied to other intrusion
detection systems to allow for comparison between systems or between different
configurations of the same system.
Massicotte also worked on the verification of signatures as a means to improve accuracy.
In particular, he worked on signature overlap where one signature can apply to multiple
subjects. This was a problem I encountered with certain data types where the algorithm
would generate a signature that applied to multiple files. This is far from ideal, because
each rule should have a one to one relationship with the content that it is intended to
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match. By analyzing the causes and avoidances of these scenarios, Massicotte was able to
improve the signatures and subsequently improve the overall accuracy of the system.
Finally, Massicotte worked on a data mining methodology of creating signatures based on
training data sets. In particular, he focused on multi-session intrusion detection systems
where the generated rules would span multiple data sets and still be applicable. He also
outlined his process for selecting a data set for training and the attributes such a data set
should possess. This was applicable to my research as I took datasets and attempted to
identify the subset of that data which would best create a rule.
Much of Massicotte’s work utilized Snort-based examples and results. This insight into
Snort was very valuable and related directly to my work. He also focused on the issue of
accuracy by attempting to find an automated solution. As with any calibration process on
a dynamic system the work is iterative. By automating this process, the accuracy of the
system can be improved at each run time, and the technology is kept up-to-date with the
best configuration and rules.
Methods for Speculatively Bootstrapping Better Intrusion Detection System
Performance
In 2012 while with the University of New Mexico, Sunny James Fugate researched
methods for improving intrusion detection system performance7. While much attention is
given to false positives and generating rules within the intrusion detection community the
impact of both on performance must be considered. As the number of threats grows, the
number of rules actively being parsed also grows putting further strain on intrusion
detection systems. Simply keeping up with the increase in legitimate traffic can be
cumbersome, but these systems must be able to withstand attacks such as flooding or

22
denial-of-service attacks where the attackers simply try to make the system exceed its
capacity.
As was shown in Santos’ paper, the problem of scaling within intrusion detections can be
overwhelming and limit the ability to effectively protect networks. Fugate focused
primarily on the scaling of intrusion detection systems and what can be done to improve
that scaling so that intrusion detection systems can continue to meet or exceed the
bandwidth requirements networks are currently facing. To do this, Fugate focused on
using predictive methodologies to improve system performance using past data sets and
results to make decisions with less computational resources being used. By doing this,
Fugate theorized that this model would be able to decrease the per signature
computational costs and thus allow systems to scale to a larger rule base.
To prove his theory was correct Fugate took two approaches. In the first, an algorithm
took predictive action and then used feedback to decrease per signature costs. This
process worked on creating thresholds where actions were taken once a threshold was
met instead of looking for a 100% match within a rule. The second approach focused on
instances where an overburdened intrusion detection system was attempting to function.
The standard behavior in this scenario is to drop packets while the system attempts to
catch up to the current data waiting to be processed. Fugate demonstrated in some
scenarios performance is increased more by simply stopping the processing of rules
instead of dropping packets. This theoretically would lower the total error rate and
provide better performance for the intrusion detection system.
Once again, this research used the Snort system to show practical implementations of the
theoretical models proposed. By focusing on the performance of Snort systems under
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stress Fugate was able to highlight some of the pitfalls of intrusion detection systems.
One of these focuses was the per signature computational cost, which is directly
applicable to my research as I attempted to automate the signature generation process.
This influenced me to focus on the computational requirements of the signatures my
algorithm was generating in an effort to keep the computational costs per rule down. If
poor rules are actively used, then intrusion detection systems are vulnerable to flooding
or denial or service attacks.
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My Approach
I have created an algorithm which takes as input a minimum of a file or a directory and
will output all required Snort syntax to comprise a valid addition to a Snort rules file. The
valid arguments which can be provided to the algorithm are:
-f, --file: The path or name of the file to be used.
-a –all: The directory to be parsed. The file and all flags are exclusive.
-s, --source: The source IP and optionally the source port as well. Defaults to the value
‘any’ if a custom value is not provided at runtime.
-d, --destination: The destination IP and optionally the destination port as well. Defaults
to the value ‘any’ if a custom value is not provided at runtime.
-p, --protocol: Allows specification of a particular protocol to monitor (IP, TCP, UDP or
ICMP). Defaults to the value ‘any’ if a custom value is not provided at runtime.
-l, --length: The signature length in number of bytes. Defaults to a signature length of 8 if
a custom size is not provided at runtime.
-v –verbose: Enable verbose output.
-r –random: Randomizes the starting point of the signature generation process. With a
fixed starting point, it may be possible for a malicious user to use this to manipulate the
signature generation process. By default, random is not enabled.
This encapsulates the basic requirements to generate all the necessary fields for a valid
Snort signature. The only required field is the file or directory that is to be parsed. All
other fields are optional and will be populated with a default entry if no custom value is
provided. This allows for a quick and simple run as illustrated in Figure 2:
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Figure 2: Example Run
However it also allows for very complex rules to be created by using the majority of the
flags shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Complex Run
Functions
Within the algorithm, many core functions have been split so that they can be called
individually. This design process was chosen so that individual functions can be called
either through the normal command line method or the code can be integrated with other
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works with ease. This additionally allowed for easier trouble shooting and validation as
each module could be tested individually.
main() – The main function is the driver for the algorithm and works by first reading in
the arguments passed at startup time. If the user specified a single file the fileParse
function will be called or if a directory is specified the dirParse function will be called.
fileParse(String) – The fileParse function calls all the necessary functions and routines
to parse a single file and output a single signature. It does so by calling the fileRead
function to read the file passed to it; then it validates the arguments using ipCheck,
validSize, and validProtocol before finally using createSig and combineSig to update the
signature String. Finally, it calls a print function to print out the complete signature.
dirParse() – The dirParse function uses the line:
files = [f for f in os.listdir(directory) if isfile(join(directory,f)) ]
to create a list of files that can then be parsed over one at a time using the fileParse
function. To achieve this, the dirParse function loops over the files list and calls the
fileParse function providing both the directory and file name to be parsed so that the
fileParse function is passed a complete file path.
vPrint(String) – This simple function checks if the verbose flag was set by the user. It
will only print the passed String if the function has been set by the user. This allows
certain informational output to be suppressed which is the default behavior so that the
output can be piped into a rules file.
argRead() – The argRead function utilizes the argparse functionality built into Python to
process all the command line arguments and store them into global variables. It also
determines the file extension is to be processed. This functions determines when a
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directory is given if it will alter the directory to be in the UNIX format using forward
slashes instead of the Windows default back slash which Python interprets as an escape
character.
fileRead() – fileRead will open the file stored in the global file variable and then save the
contents of the file into the global fileString variable as hex values. To limit the
processing of very large files, the length of the fileString is limited to 2,621,440
characters or roughly 10mb. This means that files over 10mb will only have the first
10mb processed when generating a signature. This is a compromise between speed and
signature accuracy. Processing further into files will result in decreased performance and
the first 10mb should be sufficient to create a valid signature.
ipCheck() – The ipCheck function begins by parsing the given source and destination
which can include both port and IP or simply and IP address. At the command line this
would look something like:
>python autoSnortSig.py –s 192.168.1.1:80
Where a source IP address of 192.168.1.1 and a source port of 80 are passed to the
algorithm. These strings have to be parsed first by determining if the source or
destination information was passed, secondly, by checking if it contains both a port and
IP or simply an IP, and finally by storing the port and IP into global variables if passed or
storing the default value. Once completed, the validation functions are called if the global
variables are not storing the default value.
validPort() – First the port functions checks that the provided String is an integer. If is
not, then an error is printed and the program exits. If an integer is detected, it must be in
the range of 1-65536 or else an error is printed and the program exits.
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validIP() – This is a driver function that works by separating the provided IP address into
octets and then passing those octets one at a time to the validOctave function. If the IP
address provided is not valid, then the function prints an error message and exits the
program.
validOctave() – As each octave is passed to this function, it verifies that it is an integer in
the range of 0-255 and will return True if that is the case. For all other cases it returns
False.
validSize() – This function checks the user provided signature size, verifies it is an
integer, and validates it is an acceptable value. The default value for size is eight, but
values as small as four and as large as sixty four are accepted. If an unacceptable value is
detected, then an error message is printed and the signature size is set back to the default
value eight.
validProtocol() – The list of acceptable protocols ("ip","tcp","udp","icmp","any") is
stored within a list. Any protocol provided by the user must be contained within the list
for it to be accepted. In order for this to be accomplished, the global variable protocol is
first converted to lowercase and then the list is checked to see if it contains the global
protocol. If it does not, the user input is considered invalid causing an error message and
the protocol to be set back to the default value of any.
createSig() – This function is the core of the algorithm as it takes the file as a String of
hex characters and parses it to generate a substring that will be used to populate the
content portion of the rule. It also includes a check that will randomize the start location
within the search for a valid substring if the random flag is passed by the user. The
standard starting location is the middle of the file or the middle of the first 10mb, should
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the file be larger than 10mb. The intent of starting in the middle of the file is to avoid any
patterns that are common amongst file types appearing at the beginning or end of a file.
The random flag changes that so that the algorithm starts at a random location anywhere
from 25% to 75% of the files length. Once a start position is determined, a substring is
pulled and then tested for validity. It must contain less than 50% of the hex value “0” to
be considered valid. This check is put in place to make sure the substring pulled is not a
portion of the file that has been padded with binary “0”. If the substring fails, the validity
test the algorithm increases the starting location and pulls another substring. Since this
process is designed to avoid padding within files it processes the file from the starting
point in one direction so that it can find a point that is outside of the padding. The new
substring is tested and the process continues until a valid substring is found or the length
of the file is exhausted. If no valid substring is found an error message is printed and the
program exits.
combineSig() – The combineSig function takes the content generated by createSig and
combines it with all the necessary syntax to create a valid rule. This includes parsing the
already validated global variables to determine the protocol, source, and destination to be
included in the final rule. These elements are all combined in the correct order and
necessary grammar to form a complete rule.
When all of these functions are combined the program follows a precise controlled flow.
Either a single file is parsed or lists of files are parsed one at a time. Regardless, the same
core functions are used to generate the signatures and print them as output.
The creation of the signature focuses on the ability of Snort to content match rules to
traffic in three ways using the content tag. The content tag allows for rules to be
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compared to traffic using binary, hexadecimal, or ASCII strings. This requires the input
file to be converted into one of these formats and then parse the file to choose a particular
section to be used as the signature. After research, I discovered Python had the built-in
functionality needed to read in files and convert them to all three formats prompting me
to implement the algorithm. Additionally, with Python being such a high level language, I
was able to implement the project using fewer lines of code which allowing better testing
and understanding of the data flow.
I quickly discovered ASCII was not the preferred format because many file types have
data stored in what would result in non-printable characters. This prompted complications
because the Snort rule required characters to be printed so that they could be included in
the resulting rule (which are typically edited with a text editor such as Notepad or gEdit).
When choosing between binary and hexadecimal, my findings concluded they were
functionally the same, but hexadecimal characters permitted rules with sufficiently large
signatures to be generated without creating excessively long rules. For instance, a
signature that is 4 bytes long would require 8 hexadecimal characters, but would be
composed of 32 binary characters. For this reason, I decided that all signatures would be
output in hexadecimal format.
The process of parsing the string of hex characters into a suitable signature was one that
had a wide array of challenges. The primary challenge, however, is that each file format
is unique and often includes standard header and footer content that is not unique to a
specific file. Including this content is unique to a file type and would result in all files of
the same type also being identified by the generated rule. To limit this likelihood, the
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signature is extracted from the middle of the file attempting to target the area most likely
to contain content unique to the inputted file.
Another potential pitfall is in the splitting of bytes. Because a byte is represented using
two hexadecimal characters, it is possible for the second half of a byte to be the first hex
character in the signature and the first half of a byte to be the last character in the
signature. When processed by Snort, this would result in unintended matches. For
example, with a signature length of 3 it is possible for the following to occur: (see Table
3):
Byte Number

1

File Content

A0 78 3C FF

Extracted Signature

2

0

Signature that will be used 07

3

4

78 3C F
83 CF

Table 3: Content Matching
In this example, the last half of the first byte is taken from byte one and the first half of
byte four is taken to create a signature that is three bytes long. However, the bytes “07 83
CF” are not contained in the original file content so a bad signature has been created.
To address this problem the hex characters are combined in pairs into an array so that
each element of the array represents a single byte of data. This prevents the accidental
splitting of bytes and the end result is signatures that are more likely to match the original
file content.
The final pitfall discovered was the padding within files which could output a signature
whose content was composed either primarily or solely of “00” bytes. While this would
result in a good match with the original file contents, it was also overly broad and would
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match files it should not. To prevent this, the occurrence of “0” within the generated hex
signature is checked. Based on the size of the signature, if the number of “0” characters is
too high the signature is discarded and the file is iterated over until a suitable signature is
found.

33

Experiments & Results
Lab Configuration
I had two primary requirements of the lab. My first requirement was the ability to run the
Snort software and the need to create packet captures of files being moved across the
network. The easiest configuration I found that met these goals was a virtual machine
running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. From there the necessary software, Snort, Wireshark, and an
FTP server (vsftpd), were installed and configured to a functional level. To capture
network traffic containing a specific file I utilized Wireshark while transferring files over
the FTP protocol. The resulting packet captures were filtered by port so that only FTP
traffic was contained within the created packet capture file. I selected the FTP protocol
because of its simplicity in moving files over the network in an unencrypted and
uncompressed manner. Moving files in an unencrypted and uncompressed manner is key,
because once the content was encrypted or compressed the generated signatures would no
longer be applicable. I could then use the created packet capture files as input to Snort
using to test for matches to the created rules. By performing an offline analysis of the
captured traffic I was able to recreate results and also perform multiple tests across the
same packet captures. An example of such a test is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Example Snort Run
In an offline analysis Snort reads in the provided packet capture file and then parses each
packet as if it were live data being passed across the network. Each packet is compared
against the default rule set or a custom snort.conf file can be specified which includes
alternative rule sets. After performing an offline analysis of the generated packet capture I
was able to parse the results and determine if the generated output matched the intended
results. For example while transferring a single file over FTP that has a rule generated for
it in the rules files I would expect an alert to be generated. This process in whole allowed
for the generated rules to be compared against various traffic and the results observed.
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Next I took the output of the snort analysis and compared it to the contents of the packet
capture file manually using Wireshark to determine if the signature was identifying a
portion of the file or simply some portion of the FTP overhead. This process was repeated
only for the first few transfers to validate the automated testing mechanisms. An example
search is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Wireshark Search
File Generation
To test and verify the algorithm I needed to create data sets, in this case files, which the
algorithm could parse. Then the generated signatures could be tested. To do this I
populated various file formats with sufficient random data in order for a unique signature
to be created without creating so much data that the unique format of each file type
becomes a non-factor. I decided to focus on the file formats most popular in the typical
business network settings, which are Microsoft Office formats, text files, and executables
(.exe). The process was straight forward for populating documents, but the executables
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were somewhat problematic. Therefore, I relied on publicly available executables to use
as a testing data set for the executable file type.
To generate the random ASCII printable characters, I created a short algorithm which
printed out 1,000 characters randomly chosen from all possible ASCII printable
characters. For reference, the algorithm is included under Appendix B as the file
genText.py. The output of this algorithm was then piped to various text files to create the
text file data sets. This was not possible for more advanced Microsoft Office file types, so
instead I copied and pasted the output of the script into the files manually. For
comparison, the similar Office files such as .docx and .doc are using the same random
string of printable characters. Once the requisite files were created, then I was able to
parse them with the signature generating algorithm and log the results for future testing
with Snort.
The quantity of 1,000 random ASCII characters was chosen to attempt to highlight the
challenges of finding unique content within various file types. In the simplest example of
a text file the chances of finding a substring of the 1,000 ASCII characters within a 1KB
text file is very high. In other formats which contain a larger amount of formatting and
configuration information the chances of finding the unique content is much lower.
Signature Matching
To determine if the generated signatures were valid I needed to upload the generated
signature to a rules file, restart Snort, and then have Snort process a packet capture file
that included the file being transferred. I used the default signature size with no additional
options (such as protocol or port) so that the rule would search simply for the presence of
the file signature instead of searching only a subset of the packet capture file that met the
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rule requirements. While this is not best practice in a real world application, the goal of
this test was to determine the validity of the content portion of the rule so removing all
other possible causes of a signature mismatch was needed. For each file type 10 files
were tested to establish a baseline of success / failure for that particular data type. While
this is not a large enough quantity to determine if the algorithm works against all files of
a particular data type, it does allow for a reasonable determination of success when
processing a data type. The following file types were tested with included results as
depicted in Tables 4-10.
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Text Files

Signature Generated

Results

File Size

randText0.txt

alert any any any -> any any

Match

1KB

Match

1KB

Match

1KB

Match

1KB

Match

1KB

Match

1KB

Match

1KB

Match

1KB

Match

1KB

Match

1KB

(content:"|4c6c5b326c7c346e|";)
randText1.txt

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|2031577929200d0a|";)

randText2.txt

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|5b656c2e2371555b|";)

randText3.txt

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|09553e56557b694f|";)

randText4.txt

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|2a470b78792c366d|";)

randText5.txt

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|6d0b6b39300d614b|";)

randText6.txt

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|3b59432e2756617e|";)

randText7.txt

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|682f7b7576657039|";)

randText8.txt

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|656c567473357155|";)

randText9.txt

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|6747247e0d2e5832|";)
Table 4: Text Files

39
Docx Files

Signature Generated

Results

File Size

randText0.docx

alert any any any -> any any

Match

15KB

Match

15KB

Match

15KB

Match

15KB

Match

15KB

Match

15KB

Match

15KB

Match

15KB

Match

15KB

Match

15KB

(content:"|ca5d7399e4b6afab|";)
randText1.docx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|2db7e623ec03acd8|";)

randText2.docx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|8dbdf066afd1fc51|";)

randText3.docx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|f2ef0bec98317471|";)

randText4.docx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|9a7fadbc29cd4d60|";)

randText5.docx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|93723e8f0aa79894|";)

randText6.docx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|a1ee4d8c36203371|";)

randText7.docx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|0796c938ec0d9335|";)

randText8.docx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|ccb2f3243b9f65b8|";)

randText9.docx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|72642f7765625365|";)
Table 5: Word Files
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Doc Files

Signature Generated

Results

File Size

randText0.doc

alert any any any -> any any

Match

23KB

Match

23KB

Match

23KB

Match

23KB

Match

23KB

Match

23KB

Match

23KB

Match

23KB

Match

23KB

Match

23KB

(content:"|8643a2c3a74346e7|";)
randText1.doc

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|0c3258726c6f765f|";)

randText2.doc

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|9822266798222667|";)

randText3.doc

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|b400818132300000|";)

randText4.doc

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|b400818132300000|";)

randText5.doc

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|9526d50403b7c743|";)

randText6.doc

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|530c696f6d3a537d|";)

randText7.doc

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|9e2226679e222667|";)

randText8.doc

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|4433487b705b7a0b|";)

randText9.doc

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|0000ffffff7fffff|";)
Table 6: 1997 Word Files
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Xlsx Files

Signature Generated

Results

File Size

randText0.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any

Match

10KB

Match

10KB

Match

10KB

Match

10KB

Match

10KB

Match

10KB

Match

10KB

Match

10KB

Match

10KB

Match

10KB

(content:"|c6e751cc195885a5|";)
randText1.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|ba9942d311a2d0ad|";)

randText2.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|a33b3fd18cba0567|";)

randText3.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|e701ca9951c9aeb6|";)

randText4.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|5fe7f777e911ddde|";)

randText5.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|9996fd82f31a6dc6|";)

randText6.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|daaddb1a92944129|";)

randText7.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|71daaddb1a929441|";)

randText8.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|b79f929032e8a537|";)

randText9.xlsx

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|9f929032e8a53709|";)
Table 7: Excel Files
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Xls Files

Signature Generated

Results

File Size

randText0.xls

alert any any any -> any any

Match

25KB

Match

25KB

Match

25KB

Match

25KB

Match

25KB

Match

25KB

Match

25KB

Match

25KB

Match

25KB

Match

25KB

(content:"|2848000050243563|";)
randText1.xls

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|0c50212e4044245d|";)

randText2.xls

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|7e5321206273316a|";)

randText3.xls

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|4f24575d725d705d|";)

randText4.xls

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|23e6561393c2e784|";)

randText5.xls

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|7422516573556877|";)

randText6.xls

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|553a54602a676d2b|";)

randText7.xls

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|7056596e64537a44|";)

randText8.xls

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|5d257b374e424354|";)

randText9.xls

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|40422924707d6b79|";)
Table 8: 1997 Excel Files
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Exe Files

Signature Generated

Results

File Size

AIM_Install.exe

alert any any any -> any any

Match

18MB

Match

484KB

Match

277KB

Match

898KB

Match

6.7MB

Match

4.7MB

Match

22.2MB

Match

4.9MB

Match

27.3MB

Match

894KB

(content:"|7176493855395036|";)
putty.exe

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|00006a146a506a02|";)

FirefoxSetupStub29.0.1.exe

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|2c0c084040b31f41|";)

ChromeSetup.exe

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|cccccccc8bff558b|";)

Hearthstone-Setup-

alert any any any -> any any

enUS.exe

(content:"|465004747251508d|";)

FileZilla_3.7.4.1_win32-

alert any any any -> any any

setup.exe

(content:"|00002bd1c1fa0503|";)

Gw2Setup.exe

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|8bf185c0742f85d2|";)

winscp518setup.exe

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|c465842653a29724|";)

Wireshark-win64-

alert any any any -> any any

1.10.3.exe

(content:"|b663c553c2c6d637|";)

WinPcap_4_1_3.exe

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|0d0a6129664b0d0a|";)
Table 9: Executable Files
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PDF Files

Signature Generated

Results

File Size

randText0.pdf

alert any any any -> any any

Match

108KB

Match

111KB

Match

111KB

Match

110KB

Match

110KB

Match

109KB

Match

111KB

Match

107KB

Match

110KB

Match

107KB

(content:"|2532fc8a467945e5|";)
randText1.pdf

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|2a8ce811da093f7a|";)

randText2.pdf

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|020fbff42278f819|";)

randText3.pdf

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|f2e0c47e801378f9|";)

randText4.pdf

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|3a46859d63ec00dc|";)

randText5.pdf

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|800ddae363a89f67|";)

randText6.pdf

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|0c82a6e90baff21c|";)

randText7.pdf

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|41e5296149f35369|";)

randText8.pdf

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|dcbef3b5dffefa12|";)

randText9.pdf

alert any any any -> any any
(content:"|90ba89d6c54a5ee5|";)
Table 10: PDF Files
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Tables 4-10 illustrate the generated output when the various files are parsed by the
algorithm. Looking at the match results for the one to one test of generated signature to
file the algorithm is generating signatures that match well with all the tested file types.
However Table 6 uses the simple format of Word documents .doc, and it shows a
potential problem with this methodology. Files 3 and 4 share the same generated
signature, despite containing unique randomized content, which will result in both
generated rules creating an alert when either file is detected. This is because the algorithm
is selecting a signature from a portion of the file that contains information on the
formatting of the file instead of the portion that contains the unique random ASCII
printable strings. Each file contains 1,000 random ASCII characters which makes it is
easy to compare the 1KB text files and the 23KB word files and see that the word files
contain an additional 22KB of file format specific content. Since these files are the same
size, format, and use the same content generation methods, it makes sense that the
algorithm will select a similar portion of each file. However, in a real world application
these files sharing the same signature is not advantageous. To overcome this problem the
algorithm can either be run using the random flag to select a randomized starting point or
a larger signature can be generated. To discover how deep these matching signatures ran,
I generated signatures for files 3 and 4 of increasing length until they generated a unique
signature.

Length

randText3.doc Signature

randText4.doc Signature

8

alert any any any -> any any

alert any any any -> any any

(content:"|b400818132300000|";)

(content:"|b400818132300000|";)
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9

10

11

12

alert any any any -> any any

alert any any any -> any any

(content:"|b400b4008181323000|";)

(content:"|05a005b400b4008181|";)

alert any any any -> any any

alert any any any -> any any

(content:"|a005a005b400b4008181|";)

(content:"|ffa005a005b400b40081|";)

alert any any any -> any any

alert any any any -> any any

(content:"|00ffffff7fffffff7fffff |";)

(content:"|05a005b400b40081813230|";)

alert any any any -> any any

alert any any any -> any any

(content:"|a005a005b400b40081813230|

(content:"|a005a005b400b40081813230|";)

";)
13

14

alert any any any -> any any

alert any any any -> any any

(content:"|040000ffffff7fffffff7fffff|";)

(content:"|ffff7fffffff7fffffff7fffff|";)

alert any any any -> any any

alert any any any -> any any

(content:"|00004b831100f010000800fcfd (content:"|00a005a005b400b40081813230

15

21|";)

00|";)

alert any any any -> any any

alert any any any -> any any

(content:"|24500000e4040000ffffff7ffffff (content:"|0f000924500000e4040000ffffff

16

f|";)

7f|";)

alert any any any -> any any

alert any any any -> any any

(content:"|ffffff7fffffff7fffffff7fffffff7f|";

(content:"|ffffff7fffffff7fffffff7fffffff7f|";)

)
Table 11: Word File Comparison
This leads to an interesting discovery where the generated signatures of length eight
through sixteen have a pattern of matches at length eight, twelve, and sixteen. Further
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analysis shows that many of the signatures share components with other signatures. This
is shown clearly in the signatures for file three where the signature of length 12 contains
substrings of the length 8 and 9 signatures. Signature 12 of file 3 contains 75% of
signature 8 and it contains 89% of signature 9. This also occurs across files where the
signature of length 11 from file 4 is found in its entirety within signature length 12 of file
3. From this I can infer that the two files share similar content at the algorithms starting
point which is causing them to create signatures that have commonalities. This is counter
intuitive to the idea that a longer signature is more likely to be unique. This illustrates the
concept that unique file formats may present unique challenges in creating signatures.
Based on the data collected, the algorithm is generating signatures that match with the
contents of the file(s) being parsed. However, through analysis of the created packet
capture files I found some of the matches did not align with the unique content of the
files (such as the words and phrases of a word document). Within the simple text files it
was easy to pair the generated signatures to the generated ASCII characters. See Figure 5
for an example of a Wireshark capture of a text file where the ASCII contents can be read
in the bottom right. However the .docx and .xlsx files utilize an XML based format that is
spread across multiple files and then compressed to save space. This compression made
the process of identifying where the document contents started difficult. Ideally, each
supported extension would have a unique handling that generated the signature from the
portion of the file that would contain unique content.
Signature Length
I wanted to consult both theoretical and real world scenarios that would lead me to an
ideal signature length for the default for the algorithm. For the theoretical scenario, I
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wanted to determine the average amount of bytes processed before a positive occurred
assuming that the data is random. For a single byte this is simple, because a byte is
composed of 8 binary digits and has 28 or 256 possible values. Therefore, any byte would
have a 1 in 256 chance of being the byte we are searching for leading to an average false
positive every 256 bytes. Beginning with a signature of two bytes, the formula changes
slightly as content of 100 bytes will only have 99 byte pairs (determined by: length –
(size – 1)). In order to determine the average false positive rate, we need to determine the
chance of any random byte pair being the same and then calculate the length that would
result in an average of 1 false positive.
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 2𝑘 + (𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ − (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 − 1))
However the average rates grow exponentially with 2k so the linear growth of (length –
(size – 1)) can be discarded as trivial.

Signature Length

Average Size

Signature Length

Average Size

1

28 bytes

9

272 bytes

2

216 bytes

10

280 bytes

3

224 bytes

11

288 bytes

4

232 bytes

12

296 bytes

5

240 bytes

13

2104 bytes

6

248 bytes

14

2112 bytes

7

256 bytes

15

2120 bytes

8

264 bytes

16

2128 bytes

Table 12: False Positives
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Based on Table 12, the best case signature length would limit the rate of false positives
while also keeping the computational requirements to a minimum. A signature of length 8
would produce a positive at the rate of once every 16,384 petabytes. This is sufficiently
large enough to deter false positives and is still small enough to conserve computational
resources. For this reason the default signature size within the algorithm is 8 bytes.
To determine the real world implementation, I created a ~100mb packet capture file and
searched it for signatures of increasing size beginning with 1 byte and ending at 8 bytes.
Each signature was a randomly generated hex string with no relation to the randomly
generated content of the packet capture. I created the packet capture using a variety of
normal activities, such as web browsing and video streaming, totaling in size at
106,915kb. This was all done over an encrypted HTTPS connection which should result
in an acceptable level of randomness based on the encryption algorithms used. This test
was performed five times with the signatures changing each time and the results averaged
in Table 13 to illustrate the rate of false positives. The rate of positives could then be
compared between Table 12 and Table 13 to verify that the theoretical results mapped to
the real world implementation. A larger packet capture could have provided results into a
higher signature length but at a length of four the packet capture would need to be
4,096mb to generate an average of 1 false positive. The adherence to similar rates among
the smaller signatures is sufficient to prove that the theoretical and real world
implementation support each other:
Signature Size

Occurrences

Average Size

1

432,069.8

253.39 bytes

2

1626.6

67,306.6 bytes
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3

6.2

17,244.4 kilobytes

4

.2

547.4 megabytes

5

0

N/A

6

0

N/A

7

0

N/A

8

0

N/A

Table 13: False Positives Rate
False Positives
In this experiment, I took the generated signatures from the signature matching test and
compared them against the single large packet capture file (106,915kb) generated in the
signature length experiment. By doing so, I wanted to examine the use of the generated
signatures in a real world implementation to determine if they were creating an
abundance of noise through false alerts. Ideally, none of the signatures would generate an
alert since the file they were derived from was not part of the packet capture file.
Additionally, the random packet capture file was generated without transferring any of
the file types being tested for so the danger of signatures catching other files of the same
type was not addressed with this experiment.
File Type

Results

10 .txt files

No Match

10 .doc files

No Match

10 .docx files

No Match

10 .exe files

No Match
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10 .pdf files

No Match

10 .xls files

No Match

10 .xlsx files

No Match
Table 14: Packet Capture False Positives

Based on these results, I feel that the signatures are not prone to creating false positives
when compared to random data. However, I still needed to test the possibility of
signatures being specific to file types and not simply a single file. To do this I created a
packet capture file for each file type that consisted of 10 different files of the same type
being transferred over FTP. This packet capture was then tested for one of the original
signatures found in Tables 4-10. The occurrence of false positives is shown in Table 15:

File Type

False Positives

.txt

0

.doc

0

.docx

3

.exe

1

.pdf

0

.xls

1

.xlsx

2
Table 15: File Types False Positives

Based on these results, I believe there is concern for false positives of the same file type.
In particular, I believe the most troubling are the newer Microsoft Office formats because
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they are compressed which complicates the algorithm locating the starting point of
unique content. In these instances, it would be best to use a larger signature then the
default 8 bytes. This should limit the occurrence of false positives but comes at the cost
of a computationally more challenging signature. To test this hypothesis I repeated the
previous experiment with a signature length of 16 bytes.

File Type

False Positives

.txt

0

.doc

0

.docx

0

.exe

0

.pdf

0

.xls

0

.xlsx

0
Table 16: Large Signature False Positives

This is in contrast to the results obtained in the experiments on optimal signature length.
The optimal signature length assumed the data being processed was random; thus it
would only be by chance that the signatures would match. When compared to real world
data that is in another format this assumption held. However, when comparing content
with the same format the occurrence of false positives is much higher and requires a
longer signature length. However this was only true across some of the file formats so
increasing the default signature length was not necessary. Instead a larger signature length
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can be manually specified when dealing with files known to cause a higher rate of false
positives.
Signature Validity
While I verified that the signature was being generated and it worked within my
environment, I wanted to take extra precaution that the signatures generated were valid.
To perform this test I created a rules file with all the signatures from the signature
matching and parsed it using a tool called DumbPig9. DumbPig is a tool that belongs to
the SourceFire, and it currently is under development by Leon Ward. This tool not only
checks for bad grammar or bad syntax which would result in a failure of Snort to launch,
but it also checks for possible performance-intense rules. This test in particular
highlighted the performance problems of using the default configuration that specifies
any source and any destination over any protocol. The application is called from the
command line with a flag specifying the rules file:
>./dumbpig –r allRules.rules
While rules that use the default any for protocol, source and destination are performance
problems, I was not able to identify a more suitable default value. The onus of creating
good rules with enough variables to filter the processing to an acceptable level will be
placed on the users.
Random Distribution
To work around the commonalities between files that share the same starting point I
created the ability to randomize the starting point by including the random flag at startup
time. The default starting location is at the middle of the hex String file, and this location
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is either incremented or decremented by 25% resulting in a potential starting location of
25-75% of the file String length.
To test this I selected a single file (randText0.txt) and ran it through the algorithm with
the –r flag 20 times using the command:
>python autoSnortSig.py –f randText0.txt –r
Which generated the output:
>alert any any any -> any any (content:"|6c61476273365556|";
>msg:"randText0.txt";)

As a control, I included the original signature “4c6c5b326c7c346e,” which should have a
starting point at the middle of the file since the text files are under 10mb. Then, I
determined the starting point using the algorithm within randCheck.py, found in
Appendix B, to find the percentage of the file’s length at which the signatures were
found. That data is shown graphically in the Figure 6 below.
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Figure 6: Percentage of file length
Analyzing the data, the starting points are spread uniformly between the values 0.25 and
0.75 which is the intended result. The smallest value was 0.3130 and the largest value
was 0.7130 which shows the results spanning the entire spectrum of intended starting
points.
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Conclusion & Future Work
It is possible to create signatures for files in automated fashion, but they have inherent
flaws that leave them inferior to manually created signatures. Most noticeable is the fact
that some file types have content that is not unique to the file in question. This would
result in a signature that could identify the file and would not cause an abundance of false
positives when compared against random data; however, it would result in false positives
when analyzing files of the same extension. This can be compensated for by using a
larger signature or by altering the algorithm to take specific measures based on the file
extension. The biggest challenge, however, was attempting to develop a single algorithm
which was applicable to all file types. The current algorithm provided no false negatives
while testing but it is susceptible to false positives across the same file types. Digging
deeper into the file type with the highest false positive rate, Word documents, led to
superior results at a larger signature size. It is clear that each file type would have
superior results by altering the starting location (or using the randomization function) as
well as using a custom signature size. However, the default behavior of this algorithm
was designed to address an unknown file type; therefore, it is currently configured to use
the settings that lead to good signatures across many file types.
Going forward I believe additional research can be done into the various file formats to
identify a custom algorithm that limits the number of false positives for files of the same
type. For files stored in a binary format, this may be trivial or even unnecessary.
However, for more complex file formats the process of identifying the start of unique
content could be challenging. In particular, the new Microsoft Office file format would
require a unique approach allowing the beginning of the document’s unique content to be
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identified when it is unencrypted and then again identify the start of that same content in
the resulting encrypted file. In these cases, it may be best to not look for a set starting
point, but rather choose a starting point based on a set offset or a certain percentage of
file size. These settings could be tested by file type to determine best practices and
implemented into the algorithm which already determines the file type that is being
processed.
Finally, Snort has the ability to perform various actions based on the conditions of the
rule being met. At this time, the algorithm only supports alerting when the conditions are
met but scenarios may arise where other actions would better serve the end user’s needs. I
would like to add this option as another optional argument.
Signature Generation
The signature generation process currently employed takes a broad stroke with no special
processing dependent on the type of file being processed. This shows that an algorithm
can be used to create signatures in an automated manner. However I believe further
research can be done into popular data types to determine what methodologies work best.
Each data type may be better served by a unique signature size as well as a unique
starting point so that the unique data of that data type is best collected by the algorithm.
This would result in signatures less likely resulting in false positives due to signatures
being pulled from areas common to multiple files within a data type.
Service
I believe that the algorithm would provide great value, if it could be run as a service and
set to monitor a directory or directories. When it notices a new or changed file, it would
update a rules file accordingly. To do this, the service would need to track the files by
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storing values in memory or keeping a log file containing entries for each file. I believe
the best way to track the files would be to create an entry per line containing the file
name, signature content, last modified date, and hash value. With this data set, it would
be possible to quickly check last modified date or if a new file exists while only hashing
all the files at a separate longer interval. Additionally the service would have access to a
larger data set since it will have a history of past runs and can be trained to identify
signatures that are shared across multiple files and identify them as bad. By expanding
the data set and establishing a history the algorithm can then begin to create better
signatures in an automated manner.
Script
As an alternative to operating the algorithm as a service, operation can also be configured
as a recurring script (i.e. through a schedule task or a cron job). This process would not
be difficult, but it would require a separate rules file where the output overwrote the files
content each run. This would provide another way to automate the updating of a single
file or a directory’s signature generation. This is ideal for a server, such as an FTP server,
whose contents can update without an administrator’s knowledge. These files could be
protected without any administrator actions being taken, once the recurring script was
configured.
Additional Parameters
The Snort rule set allows for additional customization not available for automation in the
algorithm’s current version. I have included all elements necessary to create a solid rule
set, but additional options create additional value for a small subset of users. I would like
the direction of these additional parameters to be need-driven based on user feedback. A
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good example of an additional parameter is the directionality of the rule. Currently the
directionality is defaulted to “source -> destination” but Snort rules also allow a bidirectional operator “<->” and the reverse direction “<-“. An additional parameter could
be accepted at runtime allowing for the directionality to be specified as well as other
parameters.
Two parameters which could create better performing rules are the offset and depth flags
within the content. These rules give more specificity to Snort as to where to search for the
content that is chosen as the signature. By being more specific the computational costs of
the signatures are reduced and this allows for more rules to be used within the same
environment.
Integration
The Snort community has a large list of add-ons developed either in house, by
SourceFire, or by outside companies or individuals. This algorithm could be included in
those offerings or integrated into some of the products they already offer. I believe that
this tool would be an ideal candidate for an open source community, as they could
identify and pursue additional file types ensuring file types used are most likely to have
the best support.
GUI
A graphical front end would simplify the process of using the algorithm. Python toolkits
such as Tkinter and wxPython exist to allow for GUI to be constructed in 2D or ever 3D.
The back end functions have been designed to tap into a GUI with the ability to provide
superior feedback or even generate the signature on the fly as the user updates his or her
entries. Since the goal of this research was to simplify and automate the Snort rule

60
generation process, I believe that going a step further and creating a GUI is something
that should be pursued in the future.
Noise Traffic
In the current experiments the packet captures are limited to either randomized data or a
single protocol (FTP). Additional testing should be done using packet captures that
contain the element being searched for as well as other traffic that would emulate a
typical networking environment. This would identify if the algorithm is creating rules
that can differentiate between the intended content and all the additional noise. While the
signatures were tested against just noise traffic and against just the intended content there
is a possibility of the combined traffic producing unintended results. These tests should
be performed to eliminate the possibility of difficulties when the algorithm is
implemented into a real world environment where the intended content and noise will be
within a single data set.
Summary
Information security is a tricky business. It takes only one vulnerability for an attacker to
exploit and compromise the entire system’s integrity. Additionally, large data leaks are
done by employees or other privileged users. This tool is designed to build on the success
of Snort and empower administrators to control the flow of their valuable information. It
is possible to generate signatures for Snort rules in an automated fashion across a file or
an entire directory. The process is quick and requires little knowledge of how the rule’s
content is generated. The algorithm takes in content and parses it making limited
decisions on how to generate a valid signature. This process has been shown to work and
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is a starting point for turning Snort into a content protection system that limits data
leakage.
By enabling protectors to be proactive, they can have the free time to better understand
their unique needs and adapt their technology accordingly. Security is often referred to as
a game of cat and mouse where the attackers are always on the forefront of exploits and
administrators are racing to stop the latest exploit. Without the ability to detect and stop
zero day attacks that scenario may never change. To compensate a defense in depth
approach must be taken so that multiple layers of defense stand between an attacker and
the valuable information or services being hosted. This algorithm is another tool that can
provide administrators further ability to protect key files or directories from traveling
certain directions across their network.
The primary strength of this algorithm is that it can be applied to any file type, and the
fact that it generates a valid, tested signature to match the content of the parsed file. This
conclusively shows that an algorithm can be used to parse files and output Snort
signatures.
The greatest weakness of this approach is that it takes a non-specific approach to files
dependent on their file type. This leads to scenarios where a better signature could be
generated by using an algorithm tuned to a specific data type. I believe that this is where
the greatest future work of this algorithm lies, and that further research may be done for
each file type to determine the best case starting point and signature length independent
of file size.
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Appendix A: Source Code – autoSnortSig.py
#!/usr/bin/python
#Designed to read in files and print out snort signatures
#Requires Python 3.3
#
#
#JMU Thesis Program
#Computer Science
#ricebf@dukes.jmu.edu
#
#
#Coded by: Brandon Rice
#Last modified 6/23/2014

import sys, argparse, binascii, os, random
from os.path import isfile, join
#Begin global variables
file = ""
fileString = ""
source = "any"
destination = "any"
sourcePort = ""
destinationPort = ""
protocol = "any"
matchSignature = ""
signature = ""
size = 8
fileExtension = ""
verbose = False
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directory = ""
rand = False
#Begin Classes
#main executes the core logic
def main():
global file
global directory
argRead()
#Determine if a file or a directory needs to be parsed
if file == "" and directory == "":
print("Either a directory or a file must be specified.")
elif file != "" and directory != "":
print("File and directory are exclusive options. Only one may be enabled at a time.")
elif file != "":
fileParse(file)
else:
dirParse()

#Function to process a single file
def fileParse(toDo):
global fileString
global fileExtension
global file
file = toDo
vPrint("File to be read " + file)
vPrint("File extension: " + fileExtension)
fileRead()
#test if file is being read in properly
#print(fileString)
ipCheck()
validSize()
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validProtocol()
createSig()
combineSig()
print(signature)
#Function to parse a directory calling all filse within the directory
def dirParse():
global directory
print("Processing directory: " + directory)
#Create a list of files to be parsed
files = [f for f in os.listdir(directory) if isfile(join(directory,f)) ]
vPrint(files)
for x in files:
#Parsing each file requires path + file name
fileParse(directory + x)

#Function to print certain lines only if verbose is True
def vPrint(x):
global verbose
if verbose == True:
print(x)

#argRead() takes in the args and prints help if needed
def argRead():
global file
global source
global destination
global protocol
global size
global fileExtension
global verbose
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global directory
global rand
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AutoSnortSignature")
parser.add_argument("-f","--file",help="Input file name",required=False)
parser.add_argument("-s","--source",help="Source IP (port optional). Format example
192.168.100.1 or 192.168.100.1:22",required=False)
parser.add_argument("-d","--destination",help="Destination IP (port optional). Format
example 192.168.100.1 or 192.168.100.1:22",required=False)
parser.add_argument("-p","--protocol",help="Specify the protocol. Acceptable input IP,
TCP, UDP, ICMP",required=False)
parser.add_argument("-l","--length",help="Specify the signature length in number of
bytes (1-64)",required=False)
parser.add_argument("-v","--verbose",help="Enable verbose output
mode",required=False,action='store_true')
parser.add_argument("-a","--all",help="Parse all files within the given
directory",required=False)
parser.add_argument("-r","--random",help="Randomize starting point to provide
additional security",required=False,action='store_true')
args = parser.parse_args()
if args.file is not None:
file = args.file
temp, fileExtension = os.path.splitext(file)
if args.source is not None:
source = args.source
if args.destination is not None:
destination = args.destination
if args.protocol is not None:
protocol = args.protocol
if args.length is not None:
size = int(args.length)
if args.verbose is not False:
verbose = True
if args.all is not None:
directory = args.all
directory = directory.replace("\\","/")
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if directory[-1] != '/':
directory = directory + '/'
if args.random is not False:
rand = True

#Reads in the provided file and stores it as a String of hex characters
def fileRead():
global fileString
global file
with open(file, "rb") as f:
content = f.read()
fileString = binascii.hexlify(content)
#Limit maximum portion of file to be processed to 10mb
if (len(fileString) > 2621440):
fileString = fileString[:2621440]
#Validates source and destination if set otherwise defaluts to any
def ipCheck():
global source
global destination
global sourcePort
global destinationPort
#Extract the port from the source
where = source.find(":")
#print("Source where is " + str(where)) #Enable for diagnostics
if where == -1:
sourcePort = "any"
else:
sourcePort = source[(where+1):]
source = source[:where]
#Extract the port from the destination
where = destination.find(":")
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#print("Source where is " + str(where)) #Enable for diagnostics
if (where > -1):
destinationPort = destination[(where+1):]
destination = destination[:where]
else:
destinationPort = "any"
#Code here to validate the ports
if sourcePort != "any":
vPrint("Validating source port")
validPort(sourcePort)
if destinationPort != "any":
vPrint("Validating destination port")
validPort(destinationPort)
#Code here to validate the IP addresses
if source != "any":
vPrint("Checking source IP")
validIP(source)
if destination != "any":
vPrint("Checking destination IP")
validIP(destination)
#Print values to be used. Can later be disabled
vPrint("Source IP is " + source)
vPrint("Source port is " + sourcePort)
vPrint("Destination IP is " + destination)
vPrint("Destination port is " + destinationPort)
#Check whether a port is numeric and within the correct range (0-65535)
def validPort(port):
if port.isdigit() == True:
num = int(port)
#test = (-1 < num)
#print(test)
if -1 < num and \
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num < 65536:
return True
else:
print("Invalid port found. Exiting")
sys.exit(2)
else:
print("Invalid port found. Exiting")
sys.exit(2)
#Check whether a valid IP address is provided
def validIP(ip):
if ip.count(".") != 3:
print("Invalid IP address found. Exiting")
sys.exit(2)
vPrint("Checking octave 1")
where = ip.find(".") #Check first octave
if (where > -1):
if (validOctave(ip[:where]) == False):
print("Invalid IP found")
sys.exit(2)
else:
ip = ip[where+1:]
else:
print("Invalid IP found")
sys.exit(2)
vPrint("Checking octave 2")
where = ip.find(".") #Check second octave
if (where > -1):
if (validOctave(ip[:where]) == False):
print("Invalid IP found")
sys.exit(2)
else:
ip = ip[where+1:]
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else:
print("Invalid IP found")
sys.exit(2)
vPrint("Checking octave 3")
where = ip.find(".") #Check third octave
if (where > -1):
if (validOctave(ip[:where]) == False):
print("Invalid IP found")
sys.exit(2)
else:
ip = ip[where+1:]
else:
print("Invalid IP found")
sys.exit(2)
vPrint("Checking octave 4")
if (validOctave(ip) == False): #Check fourth octave
print("Invalid IP found")
sys.exit(2)
#Check if provided input is a valid octave
def validOctave(octave):
if octave.isdigit() == True:
if (-1 < int(octave) < 256):
#print("Returning true on octave check")
return True
else:
print("Invalid octave found. Exiting")
sys.exit(2)
else:
print("Invalid octave found. Exiting")
sys.exit(2)
#Check if the size is between 1 and 64. If not set the size to the default 8.
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def validSize():
global size
vPrint("Size is: " + str(size))
if 3 < size and size < 65:
vPrint("Valid signature size found")
return True
else:
print("Invalid size found setting size to the default")
size = 8
#Check if a valid Snort protocol was specifed. If not alter protocol to any
def validProtocol():
global protocol
acceptable = ["ip","tcp","udp","icmp","any"]
protocol = protocol.lower()
if protocol not in acceptable:
protocol = "any"
print("Invalid protocol value detected. Setting to the default any")
#Reads the file contents and stores the hex string that needs matching
#Starts at the middle of the file and pulls hex strings until one is found with an acceptable
amount of empty (0) values
def createSig():
global matchSignature
global fileString
global size
global rand
#copy hex string for local manipulation
temp = fileString
#variable to store the hex pairs that represent a byte
fileHexArray=[]
#populating the array
while temp.__len__() > 0:
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fileHexArray.append(temp[:2])
temp = temp[2:]
length = len(fileHexArray)
start = int((length/2) - (size/2))
#Check if random is true
#If true alter the starting point by placing it in a random location from 25% to 75% of
file length
if rand == True:
random.seed
#Create variable for 0 to 25% file length
alter = random.randint(0,start//2)
#Either add or subtract the variable from start
add = random.randint(0,1)
if add == 0:
start = start + alter
else:
start = start - alter
matchSignature = ""
#extracting the signature
for i in range(size):
temp = fileHexArray[start + i]
temp = str(temp)
temp = temp[2:4] #stripping the b' and ' characters leaving only the two hex
characters
matchSignature = matchSignature + temp
#Determine the occurence of 0 in the signature. If greater then 50% loop through the
hex string searching
#for a signature that has few enough 0 to be unique. Designed to prevent signatures
that are padding.
count = matchSignature.count("0")
while (count > (size//2)):
start = start + size
if (start + size) > length:
print("Unable to find a suitable string. Try decreasing the string size")
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sys.exit(2)
matchSignature = ""
for i in range(size):
temp = fileHexArray[start + i]
temp = str(temp)
temp = temp[2:4]
matchSignature = matchSignature + temp
count = matchSignature.count("0")

#Combines all the signature elements into a valid signature string
def combineSig():
global signature
global protocol
global source
global sourcePort
global destination
global destinationPort
global matchSignature
global file
signature = "alert "
signature = signature + protocol + " "
signature = signature + source + " "
signature = signature + sourcePort + " -> "
signature = signature + destination + " "
signature = signature + destinationPort + " "
signature = signature + "(content:\"|" + matchSignature + "|\";"
signature = signature + " msg:\"" + file + "\";)"

#Begin application by calling main
main()
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Appendix B: Supplementary Code
printHex.py
##print file as hex
import binascii
filename = 'randText0.txt' ##Must be manually changed
with open(filename, 'rb') as f:
content = f.read()
print(binascii.hexlify(content[0:]))
genText.py
##Prints a string of 1000 random ASCII printable characters
from random import choice
import string
def genText(length=8, chars=string.printable + string.digits):
return ''.join([choice(chars) for i in range(length)])
print(genText(1000,string.printable))
randCheck.py
##Check validity of randomness
##Open randText0.txt and then find where the signatures
##are located within the file as a percentage of total length
import binascii
signatures = ["6c61476273365556", "5c363e316572274b",
"6f54402b43724a74", "4d2d476c21375d61",
"6f4d556a7b70477e", "5d733f3d4c5a6e66",
"4f4050794253403a", "0d0a595672653474",
"0a46562f245c363e", "70567e0b224a2b49",
"4b56334c7247402f", "5834510c70375359",
"7a462c5b59547727", "59696c70567e0b22",
"474e38750d0a4656", "54652f36556f473b",
"34510c703753595a", "380d21477c724068",
"3d3a7c6e38636f4d", "235834510c703753"]
with open("randText0.txt", "rb") as f:
content = f.read()
fileString = binascii.hexlify(content)
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fileString = str(fileString)
length = len(fileString)
for sig in signatures:
temp = fileString.find(sig)
print("File found at: " + str(temp/length))

XII
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